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Abstract 
Many spacecraft concepts under consideration by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s 
(NASA’s) Evolvable Mars Campaign take advantage of a Space Launch System payload shroud that may be 
8 to 10 meters (m) in diameter. Large payloads can theoretically save cost by reducing the number of 
launches needed--but only if it is possible to build, test, and transport a large payload to the launch site in the 
first place. Analysis performed previously for the Altair project identified several transportation and test 
issues with an 8.973 m diameter payload. Although the entire Constellation Program—including Altair—has 
since been canceled, these issues serve as important lessons learned for spacecraft designers and program 
managers considering large payloads for future programs. A transportation feasibility study found that, even 
broken up into an Ascent and Descent Module, the Altair spacecraft would not fit inside available aircraft.  
Ground transportation of such large payloads over extended distances is not generally permitted, so overland 
transportation alone would not be an option. Limited ground transportation to the nearest waterway may be 
possible, but water transportation could take as long as 67 days per production unit, depending on point of 
origin and acceptance test facility; transportation from the western United States would require transit 
through the Panama Canal to access the Kennedy Space Center launch site. Large payloads also pose 
acceptance test and ground processing challenges. Although propulsion, mechanical vibration, and 
reverberant acoustic test facilities at NASA’s Plum Brook Station have been designed to accommodate large 
spacecraft, special handling and test work-arounds may be necessary, which could increase cost, schedule, 
and technical risk. Once at the launch site, there are no facilities currently capable of accommodating the 
combination of large payload size and hazardous processing such as hypergolic fuels, pyrotechnic devices, 
and high pressure gasses. Ironically, the limiting factor to a national heavy lift strategy may not be the rocket 
technology needed to throw a heavy payload, but rather the terrestrial infrastructure—roads, bridges, 
airframes, and buildings—necessary to transport, acceptance test, and process large spacecraft. Failure to 
carefully consider where and how large spacecraft are manufactured, tested, and launched could result in 
unforeseen cost to modify existing (or develop new) infrastructure, or incur additional risk due to increased 
handling operations or eliminating key verifications.  Although this paper focuses on the canceled Altair 
spacecraft as a case study, the issues identified here have wide applicability to other large payloads, including 
concepts under consideration for NASA’s Evolvable Mars Campaign.     
Nomenclature 
m = meter 
$M = Million Dollars 
I. Introduction 
ANY spacecraft concepts under consideration by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s 
(NASA’s) Evolvable Mars Campaign take advantage of a Space Launch System payload shroud that may be 8 
to 10 meters (m) in diameter1. Large payloads can theoretically save cost by reducing the number of launches 
needed--but only if it is possible to build, test, and transport a large payload to the launch site in the first place. 
Analysis performed previously for the Altair project identified several transportation and test issues with the 8.9 m 
diameter lunar lander payload. These issues serve as important lessons learned for spacecraft designers and program 
managers considering payloads greater than about 7 m diameter for future programs.  
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The Altair lunar lander was intended to launch on an Ares V rocket and dock with an Orion crew capsule in low 
Earth orbit. Altair would insert Orion into low Lunar orbit, carry the Orion crew to the lunar surface, and then return 
them to Orion. Altair consisted of four elements: Descent 
Stage, Ascent Stage, Airlock, and Earth Departure Stage 
(EDS) Adapter. The initial Altair stowed diameter was 7.5 m, 
sized to fit within the Ares V’s payload shroud.  When the 
Ares V design expanded to a 10 m shroud, Altair’s stowed 
diameter increased to 8.973 m, as shown in Figure 1. At the 
end of the third design analysis cycle, the Altair assembled 
height was 10.09 m—taller than a two-story house; the 
Descent Stage alone was 6.5 m tall when mounted onto the 
EDS Adapter. 
To put Altair’s scale into perspective, Figure 2 compares 
launch diameter with several other payloads†. Even at the 
original 7.5 m diameter, Altair would have exceeded large 
spacecraft handling and transportation experience, both in the 
United States and among international partners; at 8.973 m, 
Altair would be more than twice the diameter of even the 
largest Space Shuttle payloads.  
II. Analysis Approach and Assumptions 
A. Altair Transportation and Test Analysis Approach 
The Constellation Ground Operations (CxGO) Project worked with the Altair test and verification lead to 
analyze potential transportation routes between hypothetical vendor points of origin, available integrated spacecraft 
certification test facilities, and finally to the launch site. This exercise involved tracing the payload from initial 
fabrication, through likely qualification or acceptance tests, transportation, handling, and launch processing. 
B. Ground Transportation Destination Assumptions 
The Ares V and its Altair payload were intended to launch from the NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC), at 
Cape Canaveral, Florida. Although a procurement strategy was never formally developed, there was a possibility 
that the various stages could be built at different locations, with integrated test and verification occurring at the 
launch site or some intermediate location. A likely intermediate location was the Integrated Environmental Test 
facility being developed for Orion at the NASA Glenn Research Center’s Plum Brook Station (PBS) in Sandusky, 
Ohio.  As a starting point, conceptual production timelines assumed Altair modules would be transported to PBS for 
                                                          
† James Webb Space Telescope is expected to launch on an Ariane 5; the ISS Destiny Module and Hubble Space 
Telescope were launched in the Space Shuttle payload bay; the Mir core module was launched on a Proton rocket. 
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Figure 1. Altair lunar lander. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of launched payload diameters (in meters). 
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environmental acceptance testing, and then delivered to KSC for integration and launch. CxGO was tasked with 
performing a feasibility study to identify possible routes from two hypothetical vendors—one in the Eastern half of 
the United States, and the other in the Western United States—to PBS, then to the KSC launch site.     
C. Feasibility Study Assumptions 
For the purposes of this study, specific geographical locations had to be identified in order to assess actual 
bridges, roads, and ports. Because the intermediate way point was Ohio, the Altair Project created a Hypothetical 
Western Vendor located in Southern California simply on the rationale that it would bound most overland routes 
west of the Mississippi River. A Hypothetical Eastern Vendor was assumed to be in the Huntsville, Alabama area, in 
order to study inland waterway routes, as well as overland routes to Atlantic Coast ports.  
 
CxGO made several other assumptions in preparing their transportation study: 
1) The spacecraft would be transported as four discrete modules (rather than assembled). 
2) Modules would be packaged in shipping containers that were environmentally controlled for all modes, 
throughout the duration of transport; shipping containers would be crane-lifted onto transport vehicles for 
all modes.  
3) Impacts of potential future road/bridge/port construction projects were not assessed. 
4) Routes assumed current Federal/local permit requirements and restrictions. 
5) Pyrotechnic devices would be present. 
III. Transportation Challenges 
A. Air Transportation 
Including ground transport to/from airports at the origin and destination, CxGO estimated the total transportation 
time from a vendor to PBS and then to KSC would take between 6 and 11 days. However, CxGO found that neither 
the Altair Ascent nor Descent Stage would fit inside available transportation aircraft. Airframes studied included 
Military C-5 and C-17 aircraft; commercial Boeing 747, Antonov AN-124, and Airbus A300-600 ST (Beluga) cargo 
aircraft; and the NASA Super Guppy (Boeing 377SG). As shown in Figure 3, the Super Guppy hull could 
accommodate the Altair Descent Stage height, but the diameter exceeded the cargo envelope by more than 1.5 m.  
Although the Ascent Stage was considerably smaller than the Descent Stage, the long Reaction Control System 
(RCS) booms extended to the Descent Stage diameter, as shown in Figure 4. The booms could have been removed 
for air transport, but that would have invalidated any assembly workmanship screens or integrated acceptance 
testing performed prior to transportation. 
 
 
Figure 3. Altair Descent Stage in Super Guppy 
cargo envelope. Graphic courtesy of David Zeiters, 
ASRC Aerospace (KSC CxGO) 
 
 
Figure 4. Altair Ascent Module with extended 
RCS booms. Graphic courtesy of Tim Collins, 
(NASA Langley Research Center) 
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NASA’s modified Boeing 747 Shuttle Carrier Aircraft (SCA) could be modified to accommodate an externally-
mounted Altair, but would require a new container of some sort (Figure 5), as well as special loading/unloading 
infrastructure at the vendor(s), PBS, and KSC (Figure 6). Carrier structure design and certification costs would 
depend on the final spacecraft design chosen, but would likely require a substantial investment.  Long-term 
operational costs must also be considered. For example, a crew of 170 people typically required a week to prepare 
the Space Shuttle and SCA for a cross-country flight, with each flight costing in excess of $230,000 (in 2003 U.S. 
dollars)2. In 2004 the Flight Crew Operations Directorate estimated SCA maintenance and operations costs at $3.0 
million (M) to $3.7 M per year3 for fiscal years 2005 through 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Truck Freight 
CxGO found that ground transportation of a load this large over 
extended distances is generally not permitted. For example, the State 
of Florida4 severely restricts movement of loads greater than 4.88 m 
wide or 5.49 m tall. This means that overland transportation alone is 
not an option.    
In discussions with select state and local municipalities, CxGO 
was assured that limited trucking to the nearest Port would likely be 
allowed, assuming the spacecraft could clear bridges or other 
obstacles along selected routes. At least one commercially available 
ground transportation vehicle was identified for this purpose: the 
Parameter 13-Axle trailer can be configured with a deck length of up 
to 27.43 m and deck width up to 6.1 m, and is capable of straddling 
divided roadways5 as shown in Figure 7. Depending on the final 
spacecraft design, detailed analysis of potential obstructions would 
be necessary for each leg of the route. 
C. Rail Freight 
Rail transportation was not explicitly evaluated by CxGO, because domestic railways do not typically handle 
cargo taller than 5.18 m, or wider than 3.35 m.6 Loads measuring 5.79 m high and 5.49 m wide may be possible over 
limited routes, but would require special equipment and permits.  
D. Waterway Transportation 
CxGO found that water routes to PBS were simpler from a hypothetical vendor in the Eastern United States than 
from the west coast. From a vendor near the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Alabama, the 
spacecraft could be barged from the Decatur, Alabama port through the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers to the 
Illinois River, entering the Great Lakes at Chicago, Illinois and continuing to the Ohio coast, as shown in Figure 8. 
CxGO estimated 10 to 12 days for the river journey, another 2 to 4 days across the Great Lakes, and 1 to 2 days 
at each end for trucking to/from the Ports, for a total of 14 to 20 days. It was also noted that transit in winter 
conditions may require assistance and escort from U.S. Coast Guard Ice Breakers, further adding to transportation 
costs and schedule. Note that in the following figures, river routes are indicated by green lines, lake routes by red 
lines, and ocean routes by black lines. 
 
 
Figure 7. Parameter 13-Axle Trailer. 
Graphic courtesy of Diamond Heavy Haul, 
Inc. 
 
 
Figure 5. Shuttle Carrier Aircraft container 
concept. Graphic courtesy of David Zeiters, ASRC 
Aerospace (KSC CxGO) 
 
 
Figure 6. Loading structure concept. Graphic 
courtesy of David Zeiters, ASRC Aerospace (KSC 
CxGO) 
 
 
  
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
5 
Water routes from the Western United States were more problematic. CxGO found that the only feasible route 
from Southern California was via the Pacific Ocean, through the Panama Canal to the Caribbean Sea, then across the 
Gulf of Mexico to Mobile, Alabama (see Figure 9). After navigating the Tennessee Tombigbee Waterway to the 
Illinois River, the remainder of the route to PBS would be the same as for shipping from an Eastern vendor. The 
ocean voyage adds 15 to 18 days, and the additional river portion would add 3, for a total of 32 to 41 days one-way 
from a Western vendor to PBS. It was also noted that transit through the Panama Canal, including international 
cargo inspections, may add several more days. 
 
From PBS, transporting a large spacecraft to the KSC launch site would 
require back-tracking through the Great Lakes to Chicago, down the 
Illinois River to the Tennessee Tombigbee Waterway, into the Gulf of 
Mexico at Mobile, then around the Florida Keys to the Atlantic Ocean, 
finally docking near KSC (Figure 10). Estimated transit time is 20 to 26 
days, not including additional time for winter conditions in the Great 
Lakes, or potential summer hurricane delays along the Gulf or Atlantic 
coasts. 
Schedule aside, there are additional costs impacts that must be 
considered. Ocean transportation may require a different type of vessel than 
the river barges currently used for other NASA Programs, necessitating a 
buy vs. rent discussion, including long-term maintenance and repair costs.  
If the spacecraft must be transferred from one type of vessel to another for 
different parts of the journey, additional time and money will be required 
for each transit, and there will be increased handling risk.   
Note that the transportation problem may become even more 
complicated if large diameter components of future heavy lift payloads are 
fabricated at international partner facilities outside the United States, 
particularly if they must undergo integrated environmental testing 
somewhere other than the launch site. 
IV. Facility Issues 
In addition to the transportation challenges, a number of test and integration facility gaps and constraints were 
also identified for large, complex payloads.    
A. Plum Brook Station (PBS) 
1. Reverberant Acoustic Testing 
The Reverberant Acoustic Test Facility at PBS was designed and built for a maximum 10 m diameter “concept 
payload.” 7  At 8.973 m diameter, Altair would have fit through the 10.52 m wide x 17.37 m tall doorway, but would 
MSFC
PBS
 
Figure 8. Waterway route from MSFC area to 
Plum Brook Station. Map courtesy of Googlemaps. 
 
 
Figure 9. Waterway route from southern California 
to Plum Brook Station. Map courtesy of Googlemaps. 
 
KSC
 
Figure 10. Waterway route Plum 
Brook Station to KSC. Map courtesy 
of Googlemaps. 
 
  
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
6 
have to be positioned closer to the chamber walls than generally recommended for this type of test. A number of 
work-around options were investigated, including positioning the payload off-center within the room and testing one 
side at a time, or testing the payload in pieces. These approaches would have incurred additional cost and schedule 
for test article repositioning or disassembly/reassembly, plus analysis to knit together the results.   
 
2. Mechanical Vibration Testing 
The PBS Mechanical Vibration Facility (Figure 11) was also designed to accommodate an Altair-sized “concept 
payload.” However, two constraints were imposed: first, testing in orthogonal axes required rotating the payload 90 
degrees between tests; and, second, modal testing would have to be performed on a locked-down shaker table, rather 
than a dedicated modal floor. Note that 
neither of these constraints were necessary 
for the smaller diameter Orion spacecraft. 
Rotating a large payload to test multiple 
axes is technically simple, but costs money, 
takes time, and increases handling risk by 
adding another critical lift to the process 
flow. The smaller Orion footprint allowed 
enough space to install shakers in two 
orthogonal axes, eliminating the need to 
rotate that spacecraft.  Modal testing on a 
locked-down shaker table is also 
technically feasible, but because it has 
never been attempted on such a large scale, 
there is some technical risk. A fall-back 
position would be to develop a separate 
modal test area in another part of the test 
facility, but that would incur additional 
facility design and construction expense. 
 
3. High Altitude Propulsion Testing 
Although the PBS B2 Spacecraft Propulsion Research Facility 
test chamber (Figure 12) measures 10.67 m diameter, the door 
opening is only 8.23 m wide. For integrated testing of the Altair 
propulsion subsystem, the spacecraft’s landing legs could have been 
removed to allow the descent module to fit through the door, then 
reattached once inside. Although technically feasible, this adds 
complexity, cost, and schedule to integrated propulsion testing, and 
potentially alters the order of testing to prevent invalidating landing 
system tests or workmanship screens already completed. While 
relatively insignificant for one-time qualification testing, this could 
be a significant life cycle cost impact for production unit integrated 
hot-fire acceptance testing.  
B. Kennedy Space Center 
1. Vacuum Testing 
Integrated environmental test opportunities at the KSC launch site are limited, but may include vacuum testing 
using the Operations & Checkout (O&C) Building’s Apollo-era vacuum chambers (Figures 13 and 14). The 
chambers measure 10 m diameter x 18 m tall, accessible via a lift-off chamber lid.  At 8.973 m, the Altair spacecraft 
would have fit inside the chamber, but access platforms around the test article would have to be removed, 
complicating test article set up and instrumentation. With little room to install thermal conditioning equipment, 
testing would also likely be limited to ambient temperature, rather than flight-like thermal vacuum conditions. 
 
 
Figure 11. Plum Brook Station Mechanical Vibration Facility.  
 
 
 
Figure 12. Plum Brook Station B2 
propulsion test chamber.  
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2. Hazardous Processing and Encapsulation 
The Altair design would have required several hazardous processing operations at the launch site, including: 
1) Install and arm pyrotechnic devices 
2) Fill, drain, and service hypergolic fuel reaction control systems 
3) Fill, drain, and service high pressure oxygen tanks 
4) Fill, drain, and service cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen tanks 
5) Lift and stack large spacecraft elements 
 
The CxGO project evaluated the Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF), Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), 
and Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF), all on KSC property. The National Reconnaissance Office Eastern 
Processing Facility (NRO EPF), located on the Air Force side of Cape Canaveral, and the commercial Astrotech 
Facility, located in Titusville, were also assessed. 
While many of the KSC facilities could accommodate some of these operations, no single facility was capable of 
performing all of these functions on a large diameter spacecraft. Preliminary studies indicated that the OPF may be 
able to accommodate hypergolic fuel servicing with modest upgrades to the facility. However, the OPF’s close 
proximity to the VAB may result in access restrictions during hazardous operations in the VAB. Using different 
facilities for different operations is another option, but would require a project to budget the annual overhead needed 
to maintain multiple buildings and provide inter-facility transportation and critical lift capabilities.   
Hazardous processing could be deferred to the launch pad, though that would compromise the Agency’s desire 
for rapid pad turnaround, as well as drive technical risk. If problems were encountered during hazardous processing 
at the pad, there would be limited options for a vehicle roll-back, particularly for a hypergolic fuel leak. Repairs at 
the pad would impact other vehicle’s launch schedules, driving cost and schedule risk for other stakeholders.    
V. Options 
There are several options for mitigating the issues outlined above.   
A. Design Smaller Spacecraft 
Just because the launch system can handle a large payload, doesn’t mean that all spacecraft must be designed for 
the maximum envelope. Program managers must carefully weigh the benefits of a large payload against the cost, 
schedule, and risk of handling spacecraft that exceed current transportation and test capabilities.   
B. Manufacture At or Near the Launch Site 
Manufacturing large diameter payloads closer to the launch site could reduce transportation schedule and cost, 
though savings would may be off-set by the need to build new test and verification facilities at or near the launch 
site. This approach also raises programmatic challenges, as it concentrates a large portion of a spacecraft’s life 
 
 
Figure 13. Altair Ascent Module relative to KSC 
O&C vacuum chamber.  
 
 
 
Figure 14. Internal view of KSC O&C vacuum 
chamber.  
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cycle—and therefore budget—at a single field center, with implications to Agency operating plans, international 
partnering agreements, and procurement strategies. 
C. Waive  Integrated Environmental Testing 
Rather than build new environmental acceptance test and verification facilities closer to the launch site, some 
integrated tests or verifications could be waived or eliminated altogether. This approach may be cost-effective for 
inexpensive, uncrewed payloads, but would prompt vigorous discussion for expensive or crewed spacecraft.  In an 
Aerospace Corporation study8 of 454 U.S. 
satellites, an exponential relationship was 
identified between percentage of satellite 
failures and Environmental Test Thoroughness 
Index (ETTI), the degree to which a 
spacecraft’s acceptance and qualification test 
program complied with MIL-STD 1540B9.    
As shown in Figure 15, the study found that 
less than 10% of spacecraft fully complying 
with the MIL-STD suffered failures, but that 
number jumped to more than 60% when only 
half of the recommended environmental tests 
were performed. For Altair, simply waiving 
integrated environmental tests would have 
been at odds with the Constellation Program’s 
high reliability requirements of 1 in 20 for loss 
of Lunar sortie mission, and 1 in 100 for loss 
of Lunar sortie crew10.     
D. Test Only at Lower Levels of Assembly 
Rather than perform fully integrated tests with over-sized test facilities, 
another option is to test at a lower level of assembly in smaller facilities. This 
method was often used for Space Shuttle testing but it should be noted that 
since each Shuttle Orbiter was a reusable vehicle, each flight essentially served 
as an integrated acceptance test for subsequent flights.  By contrast, each Altair 
was intended for one-time use, and would not have had the benefit of prior test 
flights (or of post-flight inspection to verify performance). Even if acceptance 
testing were performed at a lower level of assembly for production units, large 
test facilities may still be required for qualification testing, as was done with 
the Space Shuttle (Figure 16). 
 
VI. Conclusions 
At an estimated 6 to 11 days per production unit, air transportation is clearly the more desirable mode of 
transport from hypothetical spacecraft vendors on the East or West coast to Plum Brook Station or the Kennedy 
Space Center, but analysis found that an 8.973 m diameter spacecraft would not fit inside currently available 
airframes. Future spacecraft designers will be constrained to fit their payloads—including shipping or environmental 
protection containers—into existing airframes, or face long surface transportation timelines.   
As shown in Table 1, surface transportation to Plum Brook Station and then the Kennedy Space Center may be 
twice as fast—and likely much less expensive—if originating on the east coast, rather than on the west coast of the 
United States. Analysis found that transportation from the western United States would require transit through the 
Panama Canal, with total transport times up to 67 days per production unit. Even from an east coast origin point, the 
journey may still takes up to 34 days per production unit and would require numerous critical lift operations to 
transfer between the various transport vehicles used on different legs of the journey. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Percentage of satellite failures versus Environmental 
Test Thoroughness Index (ETTI)8. 
 
 
Figure 16. Shuttle Enterprise 
being prepared for mated 
vertical ground vibration test11. 
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Table 1. Summary of Transportation Times 
Transport Mode Western Vendor to PBS 
Eastern 
Vendor to PBS PBS to KSC 
TOTAL 
TRANSPORT TIME 
Surface 
Transport 
Total Surface  
Transport Time 32 to 41 days 14 to 20 days 20 to 26 days 34 days (minimum 
from Eastern Vendor)  
to  
67 days (maximum 
from Western Vendor) 
Truck to/from port 2 to 4 days 2 to 4 days 2 to 3 days 
On River 13 to 15 days 10 to 12 days 13 to 15 days 
On Ocean 15 to 18 days -- 3 to 4 days 
On Lake 2 to 4 days 2 to 4 days 2 to 4 days 
Air 
Transport 
Total Air 
Transport Time 3 to 6 days 3 to 6 days 3 to 5 days 
6 to 11 days Truck to/from 
Airport 
2 to 4 days 2 to 4 days 2 to 3 days 
On Airplane 1 to 2 days 1 to 2 days 1  to 2 days 
NOTE:  times do NOT include possible delays for cargo inspection through the Panama Canal, or for ice-breaker 
service on the Great Lakes during winter conditions. 
 
Analysis indicates that environmental test facilities at Plum Brook Station could accept payloads up to 8.973 m 
diameter (or could be modified to do so), assuming transportation issues were resolved. If transportation to a 
dedicated environmental test facility is not feasible, options include performing integration and acceptance testing at 
the launch site, eliminating some acceptance testing altogether, or testing at lower levels of assembly.  However, 
these solutions may increase technical and safety risk, or incur additional expense to upgrade or build new facilities.  
Once at the launch site, handling and hazardous processing of a large spacecraft is also challenging, and may require 
maintaining multiple facilities, modifying existing infrastructure, or building new, dedicated assets. Depending on 
the payload point of origin, intermediate way-points, and selected launch site, transportation infrastructure upgrades 
may prove more cost effective than building new test facilities or eliminating integrated environmental testing.  Note 
that agreements between Federal, State, and local authorities to upgrade roads, bridges, runways, or ports may 
require several fiscal year budget cycles to negotiate, fund, and implement.  Likewise, mobile assets such as trucks, 
aircraft, barges, or ships will require careful long-term purchase or lease and maintenance planning.  
Ironically, the limiting factor to a national heavy lift strategy may not be the rocket technology needed to throw a 
heavy payload, but rather the terrestrial infrastructure—roads, bridges, airframes, and buildings—necessary to 
transport, acceptance test, and process large spacecraft.  Failure to carefully consider where and how large spacecraft 
are manufactured, tested, and launched could result in unforeseen cost to modify existing (or develop new) 
infrastructure, or incur additional risk due to increased handling operations or eliminating key verifications.  
Although this paper focuses on the canceled Altair spacecraft as a case study, the issues identified here have wide 
applicability to other large payloads, including concepts under consideration for NASA’s Evolvable Mars 
Campaign.     
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